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ABSTRACT 
In my reply to critics I address a raft of issues raised by the commentators to Fault Lines of 
Globalization. These issues include: the radicalization of the Husserlian concept of intentionality 
as differance; the irreducibility of a-legality to (il)legality; the relation between legal orders and 
society; legal pluralism; the relation between power and place; contingency and modernity; fear 
and terrorism; differences and similarities between a discourse theory of law and the approach 
developed in the book; the incorporation of the findings of social theory into an account of law 
as authoritative collective action. 
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It is a rare privilege to be the recipient of such a wide and profound range of com-
ments on Fault Lines of Globalization (FLG). Each of the commentators has read 
the book carefully and sympathetically, although by no means sparing in their 
criticism, and I am deeply grateful to all of them for pointing out issues that call 
for much further thinking. When going about writing my reply to their comments, 
I had initially thought of selecting a number of key thematic issues raised by the 
contributions and dealing with them in a systematic fashion, rather than trying to 
respond on an individual basis. But I have decided, in hindsight, to respond indi-
vidually to the contributions. While there are some recurrent themes, any selection 
would have been more or less arbitrary, and would have blunted the critical edge 
of individual contributions. I would like to thank Ferdinando Menga very specially 
for having taken the initiative of putting together this special issue, and for the di-
alogue which introduces it. Our numerous conversations leading up the special is-
sue, in which Menga’s work on representation, constituent power, and human 
rights figured prominently, have been a source of great inspiration to me. 
 
Emilios Christodoulidis’ response to FLG deploys two main questions. The 
first concerns my appropriation of the phenomenological notion of intentionality 
in the course of accounting for the structure and dynamic of legal ordering. If phe-
nomenology as method aims to let things speak for themselves as given to con-
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sciousness in all their fullness and immediacy, then intentionality cannot make 
good on this promise: always yielding a partial and incomplete appearance of 
things, intentionality can only aspire to an incremental or progressive—self-
correcting—process of signification of what is intended. To redress this problem, or 
so Christodoulidis argues, Husserl turns to intersubjectivity and the promise of an 
(indefinite) progress of Reason. But why, then, insist on holding on to the notion of 
collective intentionality when accounting for the structure and dynamic of legal 
ordering? 
It is indeed the case that I have taken my cue from the guiding insight of phe-
nomenology, namely, that human relations to reality are intentional in that some-
thing appears—is given—as something to someone. And this indeed implies that 
intentional acts are always impartial and incomplete. But I develop this insight in 
a direction that is orthogonal to Christodoulidis’ interpretation of how intentional-
ity and intersubjectivity play a role in Husserl’s thinking. 
That something appears as this or as that, whether in perception, practical in-
volvement with things, the interpretation of texts, or the manifold other inten-
tional relations human beings entertain with reality, has two decisive implications 
which Waldenfels summarizes with the expression “significative difference.” The 
first is that all (legal) relations to reality are mediated by meanings: (legal) rela-
tions are indirect: the real is not a pure given, something given immediately. The 
second is that the real is not exhausted by the meaning with which it is disclosed; 
it is not a pure construct. The significative difference introduced by intentionality 
is important because it calls attention to the problem of the contingency of orders in 
general, and legal orders in particular: why is something disclosed as this, rather 
than as that? The interruption of legal intentionality wrought by a-legality calls 
forth just this question. By raising a normative challenge to a collective, some-
thing resists its disclosure as (il)legal, opening up other possible (legal) qualifica-
tions thereof and calling attention to the contingency of how the legal order would 
disclose it. How, then, to deal with the contingency of a collective’s qualification of 
something as (il)legal? 
FLG discusses what I take to be two unsuccessful attempts at dealing with the 
experience of contingency called forth by a-legality. The first takes its cue from the 
temporal structure of legal intentionality as a reiteration that leads (il)legality back 
to its source in an immediate experience: the original unity of a bounded We which 
is immediately present to itself as a collective, whether at the moment of its self-
constitution or later, and which is to be reiterated thenceforth by all future acts of 
boundary-setting. The return to this primordial We, in all its immediacy and full-
ness, would be the measure that allows of dispelling doubts about whether some-
thing should be qualified as legal or illegal in the course of boundary-setting. This 
is, in a sense, the communitarian move, which understands legal intentionality as 
the recovery of an original unity which is to be rearticulated and reaffirmed when 
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a legal collective is challenged by a-legality. In its own way, communitarianism 
endorses the phenomenological injunction—“to the things themselves!”— as a re-
turn to the We itself, which, in its primordial self-givenness, is the origin and 
measure of all boundary-setting. What I have sought to do in Chapter 4 of FLG is 
to radicalize the temporal structure of reiteration, showing that legal intentionality 
begins as the reiteration of a primordial We, which is presupposed in the representa-
tional closure which gives rise to (il)legality, yet to which there is no direct access. 
A We is originated in the representation of an original We, foreclosing that it could 
provide the measure that overcomes the contingency of how boundaries are to be 
drawn. In other words, the representation of a We as this We’ or that We’ intro-
duces difference into identity.  
There is a second way of attempting to overcome the contingency introduced 
by the significative difference, one which pins its hopes on the anticipative dimen-
sion of collective intentionality. Accepting the partiality and incompleteness of col-
lective intentionality, it understands the history of a collective as a “self-correcting 
process,” to borrow Christodoulidis’ expression. On this reading, when the antici-
pations of behavior as (il)legal are questioned by a-legality, the task of boundary-
setting is to reconfigure (il)legality at a higher level of generality, to integrate the 
normative claim which has been excluded from (il)legality, such that the anticipa-
tive structure of legal intentionality becomes ever less partial and incomplete. This 
is, in a nutshell, the way in which universalism attempts to overcome the contin-
gency introduced by the significative difference. Eschewing the communitarian re-
turn to a primordial identity that demands reaffirmation, universalism instead 
projects this identity into the future, such that an ever more inclusive legal inten-
tionality has its terminus, however long in the making, in the full and immediate 
presence of a manifold of individuals to themselves as a We. FLG argues that this 
second attempt to defuse or neutralize the contingency of legal orders will not work 
either: collective intentionality must frame normative challenges to (il)legality in a 
way that permits the reiteration of collective intentionality, i.e. that permits the 
re-identification of the collective as a self and as the same. To posit the boundaries 
of (il)legality, in response to a-legality, is to represent other-than-We as this or 
that other-than-We’, once again introducing difference into identity. 
In short, while I take my cue from Husserl’s notion of intentionality, I have 
sought to radicalize it in a way that refuses either the communitarian or the uni-
versalistic moves to neutralize the contingency of legal boundaries which arises 
from the fact that something appears as (il)legal to us. The key to this radicaliza-
tion lies in the temporal difference introduced by representation, a “temporal dif-
ference” which representation folds into the “significative difference”. This twofold 
difference in identity is what Derrida has in mind when coining the term differance, 
and which comes to a head in the objection to Husserl at the end of La voix et le 
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phénomène: “la chose même se dérobe toujours” (Derrida 1967, 117). So also the We 
and what would be qualified, in its name, as legal or illegal. 
 Christodoulidis’ second question concerns a-legality and constituent power. 
Drawing on systems theory, he argues that FLG offers an ambivalent account of a-
legality, which hovers uncomfortably between normative claims that can be ac-
commodated by the legal order and those that cannot. In the first case, the inter-
ruption is temporary; in the second, definitive. In the first case, a-legality is no 
more than the occasion for the exercise of constituted power, which contains what 
challenges a legal order; in the second, a-legality is properly ruptural: it acts 
against the order it challenges in the form of constituent power. In short, I under-
stand Christodoulidis’ objection as stating that a-legality is an unstable category 
that collapses into one of its two terms. If it can be contained, then a-legality 
amounts to (il)legality, hence is no longer a-legal; if it cannot be contained, then its 
proper semantic field is that of politics, of being-against, but then it is no longer a-
legal. Christodoulidis’ own sympathies are clear: go for constituent power, not for 
constituted power; for revolution, not for reform. 
Let me say, straightaway, that this is not the occasion to engage in a grand 
debate between systems theoretical and phenomenological accounts of legal order, 
although it would certainly be of considerable interest to try and pinpoint what it 
is that systems theory can say about law which cannot be grasped by phenomenol-
ogy, and vice versa. I limit myself here to approaching Christodoulidis’ objection 
as an objection immanent to the phenomenology of a-legality developed in FLG. 
The first point I want to insist on is that there is no such thing as a-legality “in 
general.” Behavior is a-legal in relation to a given legal collective, such that what 
is at stake is clarifying the mode of appearance of a-legality, not a series of features 
that could identify a-legality “as such,” independently of the order which is chal-
lenged. Now, the core insight about a-legality defended by FLG concerns its nor-
mative complexity: the a-legal manifests itself as a normative challenge that con-
joins a range of practical possibilities going from those which could be actualized in 
a legal order as falling within the domain of its own possibilities to those which are 
in excess thereof. In other words, the normative claim raised by a-legality conjoins 
what is practically possible and impossible for a collective. To the extent that a-
legality remains within the range of a collective’s own practical possibilities, it 
manifests itself as the “orderable,” and boundaries as variable limits. To the extent 
that a-legality raises a normative claim that exceeds the range of the collective’s 
own possibilities, it manifests itself as “unorderable,” and boundaries as fault lines. 
My argument is that these are dimensions of a single, complex phenomenon, rather 
than different modes of a-legality. Accordingly, a normative claim that appears as 
unordered but entirely orderable (as (il)legal), or as unordered and entirely 
unorderable (as (il)legal), are phenomenal extremes which can be approximated 
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but not reached. A-legality reveals the boundaries of a legal order as limits and as 
fault lines. 
But how can a normative claim appear as normative to a collective to the ex-
tent that it exceeds the range of practical possibilities available to it? I have ar-
gued in FLG that it does so in the form of an exception. Schmitt describes an ex-
ception as “that which cannot be subsumed” in a legal order, where the English 
word “subsumes” fails to capture the phenomenal complexity of the exception as 
captured by the German expression “sie entzieht sich,” which means that the ex-
ception is what defies, eludes, and exceeds a legal order, all at once. Crucially, how-
ever, an exception remains an exception to a given legal order, and in this sense 
registers in it as a normative claim. How? Indirectly, precisely through its connec-
tion to what is normatively orderable for a collective. The a-legal defies, eludes, 
and exceeds a legal order, it manifests itself as an exception, to the extent that it 
conjoins the normative claim which a collective can order to what remains 
unorderable for the collective. Far from containing constituent power by consti-
tuted power, and politics by law, the phenomenology of a-legality acknowledges 
the finite questionability and finite responsiveness of legal orders. No attempt here 
to collapse revolution into reform, or constituent power into constituted power! 
If a phenomenology of a-legality confirms that constituted power cannot con-
tain constituent power, it also poses a challenge to a theory that, taking up the 
banner of revolutionary emancipation, would simply invert the order of priority 
between constituent power and constituted power, and between politics and law. 
For a phenomenology of a-legality shows that the revolutionary exercise of con-
stituent power cannot empower, enabling a domain of freedom as a realm of prac-
tical possibilities, without also disempowering, thereby marginalizing other ways 
in which joint action might be the expression of freedom. The initiative to found a 
collective has, on the reading defended in FLG, an irreducibly ambiguous status: it 
is the expression of constituent power and of constituent powerlessness, of a primordial 
“we can” and a no less primordial “we cannot.” The strong dimension of a-legality 
confronts a collective with its powerlessness, i.e. with what cannot be said or done 
in the framework of a given collective because it intimates possibilities that lie be-
yond the variable scope of that collective’s own possibilities. The im/possibility 
that gives rise to practical possibilities under authoritative collective action (ACA) 
catches up with a given collective from ahead in the form of practical 
im/possibilities intimated by strange behavior. Constituent power lies behind a le-
gal order and ahead of it, as a-legal behavior which anticipates the emergence of 
another first-person plural perspective. The task of legal ordering as concerns a-
legality, in the strong sense of what refuses normative integration into a given col-
lective, is to respond to it by exercising collective self-restraint. Legal collectives 
acknowledge in this indirect way that they exist in the mode of a finite questiona-
bility and a finite responsiveness. (See Lindahl 2015).  
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Fabio Ciaramelli’s comments focus, amongst others, on the phenomenological 
delimitation of the legal order as a normative order. In particular, he notes that le-
gal norms bestow a legal meaning on facts that have a social and cultural signifi-
cance of their own, hence which already possess a pre-juridical normativity which 
constitutes the extra-juridical limit of legal orders and whence these orders draw 
their sustenance. Primary norms, to borrow Hart’s terminology, exist in all socie-
ties; but law emerges as a distinct normative order with the emergence of second-
ary norms, i.e. with the explicit, regulated, and controllable institutionalization of 
the production of primary norms. 
Ciaramelli’s considerations point to an important issue which FLG discusses 
only tangentially, namely, the relation between legal orders and society. Signifi-
cantly, Rummens also broaches this problem in his comments to FLG, pointing to 
similarities between my very brief comments on this issue and Habermas’ extend-
ed analysis thereof. The issue is also indirectly raised by Walker, when he calls for 
a more sociologically informed development of the first person plural account of 
law outlined in FLG, especially in a global context. While an extended discussion 
of the relation between legal orders and society will have to wait for another occa-
sion, I would like to take the opportunity to clarify in a bit more detail what I take 
to be the issue at hand. 
In effect, Section 1.2 of FLG notes in passing that legal orders draw on and 
come to stand out against the background of a more or less anonymous form of 
normativity, one which is both anterior and posterior to the reflexive operation 
whereby a manifold of individuals refer to themselves as a We. The section refers 
to this pre- and post-reflexive interaction as social, and to the manifold of individ-
uals who interact in this way as society. The precedence of social interaction to the 
reflexive operation whereby a manifold of individuals refer to themselves as a We 
is not merely chronological; it concerns, instead, a relation of dependency: the 
point of legal orders, hence who ought to do what, where, and when in the course 
of ACA, does not emerge from the void; ACA leads back to patterns of social inter-
action, which are themselves already spatial, material, temporal, and subjective, 
and whence a given legal collective emerges as a distinctive normative order. This 
contributes to explaining what it means that representational acts must presuppose 
legal unity in the very process of creating it. Unless representation can latch on, as 
it were, to existing patterns of social interaction, revealing them as patterns with a 
point, and which characterize us as a group, representation would be a wheel that 
spins in empty air; it could secure no perlocutionary uptake among its addressees. 
Kant understood this very well, as Castoriadis points out, because “the organiza-
tion of a ‘world’ beginning from the Mannigfaltigkeit (diversity) of sensible givens 
[données] presupposes that this Mannigfaltigkeit already possesses a minimum of 
intrinsic organization; because it at least has to be organizable. No category of cau-
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sality would be capable of legislating a Mannigfaltigkeit that would conform to this 
law.” (Castoriadis 1986, 335) But this is not the whole story about how a legal or-
der comes to stand out against the background of social interaction. For represen-
tation, as FLG insists time and again, is, paradoxically, the creation of what is given. 
Representation cuts through what is an entangled web of social relations, demar-
cating a range of social interaction as a distinctive form of collective action and as-
signing to it a normative point in the very act of claiming that it does no more 
than reflect what we already understand ourselves as doing together in the course 
of our everyday lives. In short, the passage from the anonymity of “one” who acts 
to the first-person plural perspective of the We which acts comes about through a 
representational act that draws the boundaries of a collective. That a legal collec-
tive emerges from and comes to stand out against the background of anonymous 
social relations means, therefore, that representation includes and excludes: it 
draws the boundaries that include certain social relations, differentiating and sta-
bilizing them, as Ciaramelli puts it, in the form of authoritatively mediated collec-
tive action, while also excluding all other social relations, which are pushed into 
the background as the anonymous domain of what remains unordered for that We 
in joint action. 
But, as indicated in Section 1.5, anonymity does not only precede the emer-
gence of a legal order; it also follows it. By this I mean two things. The first is that 
social interaction not only informs legal orders but is also informed by these. The 
patterns of behavior deployed in social interaction are always already permeated 
by law, such that it is impossible to separate social and legal interactions as, re-
spectively, a substructure and a superstructure. The second is that anonymity fol-
lows up the first-person plural perspective in the sense that acting in conformity 
with the law need not require taking up the perspective of a legal We: this is simp-
ly how “one” does things, how things are done—after law has done its work. Indi-
viduals don’t typically live through their everyday lives in the reflexive stance of a 
properly legal agent, as the Lafayette examples of Chapter 1 make clear. The 
measure of law’s success in structuring social interaction lies in its capacity to be-
come habitual, anonymous behavior. 
It is tempting to think that there is a more or less peaceful continuity leading 
from the social to the legal and back, and from the anonymous normativity of so-
cietal interaction to the first-person plural normativity of legal interaction and 
back. This temptation should be resisted. Because the inclusion which gives rise to 
a legal collective is paired to the exclusion of what thereby becomes, from its per-
spective, the unordered domain of societal interaction, the latter is the domain 
whence a-legality irrupts into that legal order, interrupting the flow of collective 
action by calling into question the boundaries that establish who ought to do 
what, where, and when. In such irruptions or immergences, as I called them, the 
social manifests itself not only as what is more than a legal order, to the extent that 
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it contains a surfeit of practical possibilities which have been excluded, but also as 
what is other than it, or more precisely, as what is strange to a legal collective, 
hence as what is discontinuous—even radically discontinuous—with a given legal 
order. It is in this deeper sense that the social precedes a legal order, as that which 
a legal order could not anticipate and reaches it “too early.” The discontinuity also 
operates in the passage from legal interaction back to societal interaction. To the 
extent that a legal collective frames the normative challenge raised from the social 
domain as the question about what our joint action ought to be about, its incorpo-
ration of the social, through a transformed configuration of ACA, goes hand in 
hand with its exclusion. 
This has a fundamental implication which I can only begin to spell out here in 
a very preliminary fashion, reserving its fuller discussion for another occasion: the 
relation between a legal order and society is not the relation between, respectively, 
a particular and a general normativity; the normativity at work in social relations 
is not the domain of a common normativity shared by all members of society, of 
which legal orders are merely so many particular manifestations. In other words, 
the normativity of the social is not the normativity, however “thin,” shared by all 
members of an all-encompassing moral “We,” and which admits of particulariza-
tion in diverse legal orders, such that, in the case of conflict about a legal order, 
this shared normative bedrock must already have been presupposed by all parties 
in conflict and to which they must recur if sorting out their differences is to be a 
rational process. That the social domain is anonymous means, as I understand it, 
that it is always in excess of what is or can be deemed common. A phenomenology 
of a-legality suggests, against discourse theories of law, that distinguishing be-
tween the “moral” and the “ethical” in legal orders, between the universal and the 
particular in law, will not domesticate or neutralize the social as the domain which 
manifests itself to a given legal order as orderable and as unorderable: as magma, to 
recall Castoriadis’ magnificent expression (Castoriadis 1986, 286).  
 
Martin Loughlin’s commentary raises an objection that has a negative and a 
positive face. Negatively speaking, the ACA-model of law does not support the de-
fense of overlapping legal orders, and more broadly of legal pluralism, which it is 
supposed to justify. From “a legal perspective,” as he puts it, the relation between 
a state and a multinational such as Shell, no matter how economically powerful, is 
not one of overlap but rather of dependency. Not surprisingly, therefore, the ex-
amples of legal ordering outlined in Part II of FLG are all examples which have a-
legality challenging states and their boundaries. Positively speaking, or so 
Loughlin argues, FLG is in fact a reformulation of jus politicum or droit politique; 
the book offers an extended philosophical analysis of what is specific to the politi-
cal domain in which modern public law is located. 
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Notice, to begin with, that I use the term pluralism and plurality in two dis-
tinct ways. There is pluralism in the sense of overlapping legal orders, namely, the 
existence of two or more legal orders in “the same spatio-temporal domain,” to re-
peat the formulation typically used by defenders of legal pluralism, and there is the 
pluralism, or more precisely pluralization, called forth by a-legality, such that, by 
challenging the boundaries of (il)legality drawn by a given legal order, a-legality 
intimates anotherpossible legal order. While FLG indeed argues for legal pluralism 
in the first sense, it avers that plurality or pluralization in the second sense is fun-
damental: one could, on the face of it, imagine the emergence of a single global pol-
ity that covered all aspects of law, thereby precluding legal pluralism in the first 
sense. But even this extreme example of legal monism would be vulnerable to 
pluralization in the second sense, thereby paving the way for the emergence of a 
novel legal order, hence of legal pluralism in the first sense.  
Loughlin singles out one of the examples I proposed of non-state legal orders, a 
large multinational such as Shell, in making his case against legal pluralism as 
overlapping legal orders. It strikes me, however, before turning to examine this 
case, that he doesn’t mention the other examples I marshal, such as the legal order 
of the U’wa, lex mercatoria, and cyber-law. These examples, in his view, would no 
doubt also fall prey to objection. But would they? Take the case of the U’wa: from 
the perspective of the Colombian collective they no doubt are part of Colombia and 
are entirely subordinate to its legal order. The point is, however, that they have 
never accepted the authority of that legal order, viewing it as the continuation of 
colonization. They view themselves as a distinctive collective, with laws of their 
own which do not draw their binding character from their authorization by the Co-
lombian legal order. Theirs is a first-person plural perspective irreducible to that of 
the Colombian collective. To speak of overlap here is not to engage in legal sociolo-
gy; it is to argue that a first-person plural perspective is crucial to the very concept 
of legal order, and that once this is acknowledged a host of legal orders become vis-
ible which are concealed when the state/international law tandem is taken to be 
exhaustive of legal order. These are orders which, from the perspective of the state, 
may be dependent on it, yet which lay claim to a distinctive first-person plural 
perspective, irreducible to that of states and their claim to authority. Certainly, 
whether or not this distinctive first-person plural perspective actually manages to 
consolidate itself is not only a question about validity; it is also a question about 
effectiveness. Loughlin’s seemingly unambiguous reference to “a legal perspective” 
is in fact the reference to the first-person plural perspective of a collective that 
claims authority over behavior that may well understand itself as authorized from 
another “legal perspective.”  
These considerations cast new light, I think, on why there is a case to be made 
for viewing large multinationals such as Shell as laying claim to a distinctive first-
person plural perspective of their own. While Loughlin is no doubt right in arguing 
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that they must needs incorporate themselves somewhere, and are subject to the 
laws of the states in which they operate, they take up a first-person plural perspec-
tive, when issuing their internal regulations, which is irreducible to that of any of 
the states in which they operate, and which commands a high measure of effec-
tiveness even when those internal regulations are shown to be in breach of the law 
of a given state. It is significant that the occupation of the Brent Spar rig, and the 
extraordinarily wide public support which this action called forth, was directed at 
Shell itself, not against the UK or Norway, and precisely because Shell displayed a 
level of autonomous decision-making in the pursuit of its global interests in a way 
that neither the UK or Norway could adequately authorize or contain by way of 
legislation enacted from their state-centered first-person plural perspectives. 
Loughlin would certainly want to add that these multinationals rely on state 
law for the enforcement of their internal regulations; to that extent, at least, they 
remain thoroughly dependent on states. Yet even this claim may be contested, to 
the extent that a variety of multinational companies apparently use the services of 
private military contractors to enforce at least some of their internal regulations in 
certain parts of the world. More importantly, however, the concept of legal author-
ity enjoined by the ACA-model of law does not entail that the monitoring and en-
forcement functions of authority have to be coordinated from a single first-person 
plural perspective. As argued in FLG, whereas there is an emergent first-person 
plural perspective of lex mercatoria monitored by arbitration tribunals, the en-
forcement of arbitration awards requires state intervention. This suggests that the 
emergence of novel legal orders in a global context does not simply replicate the 
authority structures of states; Neil Walker has pointed out, correctly to my mind, 
that what is distinctive about the current constellation is that a variety of legal 
orders, including state orders, institutionalize a reference to another legal order and 
its own interests in the ongoing process of engaging in collective self-identification 
(Walker 2008). The ACA-model of law can accommodate and make conceptual and 
normative sense of this institutional innovation in ways that are not available to 
state-centered accounts of law. 
The second half of Loughlin’s ex negativo objection concerns my examples of a-
legality in Part II of FLG. He points out that these examples are all examples 
drawn from the contestation of state boundaries, thereby confirming his claim that 
a-legality only makes sense from a state perspective. It is indeed the case that the-
se examples are state-centered. But, for the reasons indicated heretofore, the Brent 
Spar case is not, or in any case not only, a challenge to state boundaries: first and 
foremost it is the challenge to how Shell draws spatial, temporal, subjective, and 
material boundaries in the course of its global activities. In the same way, the a-
legal challenge of the U’wa is not only addressed to Colombian state-law: it is also 
a challenge to international law and, crucially, to lex constructionis. Finally, the 
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example explored in Section 2.5 of FLG is not merely a challenge to state law: it is 
also a challenge to cyber-law itself. 
It would not have been difficult to offer other examples of a-legality which are 
not state-centered. Consider the WTO. Like a state, the WTO configures itself as a 
spatial unity, even if in a way very different thereto, namely as a global market. 
Unlike a state, however, the spatial unity of the WTO is irreducible to territoriali-
ty. Indeed, the WTO organizes itself as a unity of legal places—a global market—
in a way that supersedes the domestic/foreign distinction associated with states, 
regional orders such as the EU, or even classical international law, to the extent 
that the latter regulates relations between states. Yet this does not mean that the 
WTO has moved beyond the inside/outside distinction in the fundamental sense 
envisaged in FLG. Indeed, global activists continuously challenge it as being high-
ly exclusionary in its operation, inasmuch as the enactment of a world market 
marginalizes other kinds of places as unimportant and irrelevant, yet places that 
activists deem important and relevant, and that are intimated by forms of behav-
ior which contest the normative criteria governing how the WTO organizes itself as 
a global market. Think, for example, of direct action by India’s Karnataka State 
Farmers’ Association (KRRS) against measures of trade liberalization under the 
aegis of the WTO. By mobilizing to occupy and destroy fields of GMOs in the ef-
fort to preserve and revalorize “traditional” Indian peasant ways of life, the 
KRRS’s direct action intimates a place that is outside the WTO, even though not 
in the sense of a “foreign” place. Instead, their direct action intimates a strange 
place, a place that, from the KRRS’s perspective, refuses normative integration in-
to the differentiation and interconnection of places that the WTO calls its own 
space: a global market.   
Nonetheless, I would like to reconstruct Loughlin’s objection in a way that, to 
my mind, does points to an important problem which FLG has not addressed. 
Even if state law does not exhaust ACA in a global context, should state law enjoy 
a certain priority in an account of a-legality? At one level, the question concerns 
why the state will continue to play an indispensable role in our understanding of 
legal orders in a global context. At another level, the question directly engages a 
phenomenology of a-legality. Indeed, even if a wide array of examples can be mus-
tered to show why state boundaries do not exhaust the scope of a-legality, it may 
well be that any a-legal challenge to non-state legal boundaries must also involve a 
challenge, direct or indirect, to state boundaries. This issue can only be settled on 
the basis of an answer to a yet more fundamental problem. In effect, I view 
Loughlin’s objection as the invitation to radicalize a phenomenology of a-legality 
by way of an inquiry into the constitutive relation between legal place and political 
power. Does the relation between territoriality and state power reveal structural 
features which are constitutive for the possibility of drawing the inside/outside dis-
tinction in the fundamental sense indicated in FLG, and on which all other legal 
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orders must rely in one way or another? Or is the internal connection between ter-
ritoriality and state power but one of the possible permutations of that general re-
lation? I am in principle happy with Loughlin’s characterization of the inquiry 
outlined in FLG as an attempt to carry further thinking about droit politique, but 
in the understanding that at its core is an inquiry into the constitutive relation be-
tween legal place and political power that doesn’t take for granted that this is only 
or even ultimately an inquiry about that “special type of (compulsory) association 
that we know as the state.”  
 
Sofia Näsström raises two questions about FLG. The first is whether the con-
cept of a-legality depends on a certain “form of historical consciousness” or a cer-
tain “form of government.” I take it, for starters, that the “or” is not disjunctive, 
inasmuch as forms of government arguably have forms of consciousness (I would 
speak of a metaphysics) as one of their preconditions. Lefort, for example, never 
tires of reminding his readers that democracy and totalitarianism, as manifesta-
tions of politics (la politique), presuppose the specific understanding of the political 
(le politique) which emerges with modernity. In this context, I would argue that 
the notion of a-legality is preconditioned by the experience of contingency proper 
to modernity. The a-legal registers in a given legal order as legal or illegal, while al-
so raising a normative claim that challenges both poles of the distinction, thereby 
intimating another possible structuring of the legal/illegal distinction. The chal-
lenge of a-legality opens up a range of other possible ways of positing (il)legality, 
going from possibilities available to that legal order to possibilities which surpass 
the range of its own possibilities, requiring another first-person plural perspective 
be realized. The experience of the contingency of a certain way of drawing the dis-
tinction between legality and illegality is, precisely, what the “a” of a-legality 
seeks to capture. 
Now, this experience of the contingency of legal orders presupposes a historical 
mutation of the concept of order, and of the human relation to order, which can be 
tracked quite precisely in terms of the concept of change and of the relation be-
tween actuality and possibility which goes from Antiquity to modernity. If philo-
sophical thinking about order articulates the most elemental presuppositions of an 
era about the structure and transformation of being, then, arguably, Aristotle’s 
theory of change, and the passage from potentiality (dynamis) to actuality 
(energeia), suggests that, for the Greeks, actual order exhausts possible order. In 
such a context, the experience of a-legality is not available, which collapses into 
the extant distinction between legality and illegality. The kosmos is an order with 
an inside but no outside. Thomas Aquinas’ reflections on the relation between ac-
tuality and possibility deployed by divine power illustrate the profound transfor-
mation in the concept of order ushered in by the Middle Ages. Divine power not 
only implies bringing into being in the radical sense of substituting esse for the 
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nihil, but also bestowing the world with a determinate order that, while binding on 
human beings, God could have created otherwise. Thus Medieval thinking intro-
duced the problem of contingency by recognizing that the actual doesn’t exhaust 
the possible. But here also there is no room for a-legality: whereas the extant world 
order is contingent for God, it appears as obligatory—necessary—for human being. 
A-legality collapses, once again, into (il)legality. 
Hans Blumenberg has traced the dramatic sharpening of the experience of 
contingency in late Medieval thinking about order, and which he summarizes with 
the expression “Ordnungsschwund” (loss of order). The modern reaction to this loss 
of order obtains one of its most momentous manifestations in the 11th Thesis of 
Feuerbach: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; 
the point is to change it.” If, for Scholastic philosophy, the extant world is one of 
the possible worlds that meets the condition of non-contradiction, modernity is 
premised on the idea that, in the face of an extant world rife with internal contra-
dictions, human action can call into being a world that meets the condition of non-
contradiction. As human being finds itself in a world given to it as the condition 
for its action, its productive relation to the world is necessarily immanent rather 
than transcendent. We are always already in-the-world, a world that, having for-
feited its binding character for us to the extent that it is self-contradictory, is also 
the world we can act upon, ordering it in a new way. It is this historical constella-
tion, a constellation in which the actual does not exhaust the possible for human 
beings, that the experience of a-legality can emerge, and precisely because it artic-
ulates the experience of the contingency of how legal orders structure (il)legality. 
(See Lindahl 2008; Lindahl 2015) 
The crucial question, however, is how to deal with the contingency of legal or-
ders, hence with a-legality. Here, philosophical thinking encounters a fork in the 
path. There is one approach to the human relation to contingent legal orders which 
has practical rationality, in a broad sense of the term, overcome contingency: eman-
cipation, in the singular. History becomes the story of human emancipation from 
contingency. This is, I daresay, the mainstream approach to practical rationality, 
an approach that commands the allegiance of some of the most influential contem-
porary philosophical accounts of legal order and legal ordering, including herme-
neutics and discourse theories of practical reason. There is, however, a second ap-
proach to the problem of contingency, and to which I subscribe in FLG. For this 
approach, (legal) rationality is about dealing with contingency. It acknowledges, as 
does the mainstream account, that (il)legality, as posited by any given legal order, 
is contingent, such that other ways of drawing this distinction are possible. But it 
takes issue with the assumption that contingency can be overcome. This is what is 
at stake in the defense of a complex logic of boundaries, which don’t simply include 
what they exclude, but also always exclude what they include. This insight by no 
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means proscribes emancipation from a politics of boundaries; but it does entail 
that there are emancipations in the plural, not emancipation in the singular. 
This brings me to the second part of the first question posed by Näsström, 
namely, whether a-legality epitomizes a specific mode of political organization: 
democratic self-government. This is a topic FLG doesn’t develop, or at least not di-
rectly, as it is primarily concerned to outline the general conceptual and normative 
framework of a politics of boundaries. I would argue, however, that a-legality and 
its attendant politics of boundaries need not be limited to modern democracy. 
There are several indications to this effect in the book, most notably the analysis of 
the relation between a constitution and collective self-empowerment in Section 3.5. 
Yet I would like to take up Näsström’s question in the following way: how 
should we understand a democratic politics of boundaries in light of a-legality? 
Most abstractly, it seems to me that the two interpretations of modernity outlined 
above suggest two different interpretations of democracy: one which views it as a 
politics of boundaries aimed at overcoming a-legality; the other, as a politics of 
boundaries that would deal with a-legality. The first is a politics of boundaries ori-
ented to totalization. The normative core of this version of a democratic politics of 
boundaries is the ideal of mutual or reciprocal recognition. The second version of a 
democratic politics of boundaries is oriented to what might be called the entwine-
ment of the own and the strange. Negatively, the notion of entwinement rejects 
totalization as the telos of a democratic politics of boundaries. Positively, the no-
tion of entwinement argues that the normative core of an alternative version of a 
democratic politics of boundaries is what I would call the asymmetrical recognition 
of the strange(r), that is, a politics of boundaries whereby the response to the chal-
lenge of a-legality recognizes the strange(r) as one of us and as irreducibly strange. 
This reading of recognition interprets democracy as restrained collective self-rule; it 
is the interpretation of democracy that follows from FLG, even though the book 
doesn’t directly address this set of issues. 
These considerations lead to Näsström’s second question, namely, the basis for 
the claim that collective self-restraint is the appropriate normative response to a-
legality, in the face of experience of fear that the a-legal can call forth. This ques-
tion impinges directly on the problem of security, both individual and collective. 
The fear (and, in varying degrees, fascination) sparked by a-legal behavior points 
to two dimensions of insecurity. On the one hand, there is the insecurity propitiat-
ed by illegality; a-legal acts, to the extent that they are illegal, generate insecurity 
by imperiling the capacity of a group of individuals to order their interpersonal re-
lations in accordance with the normative point of joint action. I call this a “sec-
ondary” form of insecurity. On the other hand, a-legal acts, to the extent that they 
open up other ways of ordering interpersonal relations, generate insecurity in its 
“primary” form: that we are a collective and what we are a collective is called into 
question. The most extreme manifestation of the relation between a-legality and 
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insecurity is terrorism. By qualifying an act as terrorist, the authorities of a polity 
deny that this act can be the index of another legality, claiming, instead, that it is 
the expression of sheer illegality, hence that it is the acute manifestation of what I 
called a secondary form of collective insecurity. Paradoxically, an a-legal act which 
definitively eludes the distinction between legality and illegality, as posited by a 
polity, is qualified as the definitive confirmation thereof, such that there is no op-
tion—or so authorities claim—but to enforce legality. In this sense, terrorism is an 
absolute concept. Why, then, exercise collective self-restraint in the face of terror-
ism? FLG suggests two arguments to this effect. The first turns on the retroactivi-
ty of legal responses to a-legality: that an act is an act of terrorism is never entirely 
independent of its responsive framing as such. Self-restraint in the face of terrorism 
is the way in which a collective indirectly acknowledges that there is an inevitable 
framing effect in its qualification of an act as terrorist. The second follows from the 
first: terrorism, like all manifestations of a-legality, is a relational concept insofar 
as it presupposes the first person plural perspective of a given We. The failure of 
the Bush Administration to obtain worldwide consensus on an univocal definition 
of terrorism shows that there is no bird’s eye view of what counts as terrorism, no 
‘‘universal,” subject-independent definition thereof. Self-restraint is the way in 
which a collective indirectly acknowledges the relational character of what mani-
fests itself to it as absolute.  
 
Stefan Rummens offers an extended critique of FLG along two fronts. On the 
one hand, he argues that FLG’s objections to Habermas’ discourse theory of law 
misconstrue it in important ways, thereby underestimating its capacity to accom-
modate the contingency of legal order. On the other, Rummens raises questions 
about the relation between normativity and contingency espoused by a theory of 
a-legality. He develops these two sets of objections in considerable detail; I can on-
ly address here what I take to be the most important issues.1 
Let me begin by immediately acknowledging that FLG is long on conceptual-
izing the relation between legal orders and their boundaries, and short on working 
out the normative implications thereof. Whereas the first six chapters are broadly 
conceptual in character, only chapter seven—the last of the chapters—engages di-
rectly with normative issues. There are two excellent reasons for this imbalance. 
The first is the absence of a sustained and systematic analysis in contemporary le-
gal theory of how boundaries structure legal orders and of the peculiar dynamic 
governing how boundaries are set. The second is that normative accounts of legal 
order and ordering nonetheless do rely on a more or less implicit interpretation of  
                                           
1 In particular, I would have wanted to respond to his concern about my reading of 
Benhabib’s discussion of immigrant rights. I refer the reader to (Lindahl 2009) for the full-blown 
development of the argument against Benhabib, which could only be presented in highly 
abridged form in FLG. 
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how boundaries do their work of including and excluding. By concentrating largely 
on conceptual analysis, I have sought to fill a theoretical lacuna in contemporary 
legal and political theory and to prepare the ground for an alternative normative 
theory, showing how the way in which boundaries are conceptualized is of crucial 
importance to developing a viable account of legal normativity. The price to be 
paid for this approach is that the normative account of chapter seven remains un-
satisfactory in at least two ways. On the one hand, the chapter goes no further 
than sketching out the boldest lines of a normative theory of legal order alterna-
tive to particularism and universalism; what normative light it could shed on, say, 
the concepts of justice, freedom, (in)equality, and security are issues which remain 
pending. On the other hand, the chapter does not engage in a full-blown discussion 
of the normative positions it critiques, thereby running the risk of being unfair in 
its critique. Rummens’ objections ably illustrate these shortcomings, and I would 
like to take this opportunity to further clarify areas of convergence and divergence 
between Habermas’ evolving discourse theory of law, as interpreted by Rummens, 
and the normative approach to legal ordering suggested by FLG. 
Rummens’ first objection is that I misconstrue the nature of legal discourse in 
Habermas, for whom, “just like moral discourse, [legal discourse] is a ‘constructive’ 
and ‘bottom up’ process whereby people start from real situations and real prob-
lems in their actual society and try to come up with ‘local’ solutions.” My own ac-
count of legal orders as standing out against and emerging from the background 
normativity of social interaction is very much in line with, and confirms, the con-
tinuity between moral and legal discourses, or so he argues, such that the legal dis-
course “allows for the proper institutionalization of moral discourse” aimed at the 
“construction of a moral ‘we-perspective’,” an expression that I would presumably 
be only too keen to use. 
   I respectfully submit that the critical thrust of FLG is oriented to rejecting 
each of the key presuppositions that inform this account of legal discourse. FLG 
nowhere refers to a “moral ‘we-perspective’” as the telos of a legal discursive pro-
cess oriented to reaching agreement in the face of boundary-challenges; moreover, 
FLG rejects the assumption that law allows for the proper institutionalization of a 
moral discourse; finally, it takes issue, as a matter of principle and not merely in 
fact, with the assumption that legal discourse can ever be a merely “bottom up” 
process. 
The critical thrust of FLG is directed against the continuity between law and 
morality presupposed by a theory of legal discourse. The ACA-model of law entails 
that the institutional character of legal ordering highlights a crucial discontinuity 
between law and morality. The first-person plural perspective of a We in legal ac-
tion involves the authoritative monitoring of joint action, which includes the mon-
itoring of conflict about joint action. Crucially, authorities claim for themselves 
the right to settle, in the last instance, which normative challenges to a legal order 
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are admissible in a legal discourse oriented to resolving conflict and what is the ap-
propriate response thereto. Again: legal authorities claim for themselves the right to 
ultimately determine the bounds within which the transformation of a legal order 
is permissible, and precisely because what is at stake is maintaining the unity of a 
collective, that is, ensuring that the transformation of a legal order, in response to 
a-legal challenges, allows for the collective’s continued self-identification. The rela-
tion to the other deployed by a legal discourse is and remains essentially asymmet-
rical. I by no means assume, as Rummens suggests, that Habermas favors a “top-
down,” substantively determined concept of legal order. Instead, what FLG seeks 
to point out, contra Habermas and contra Rummens, is that legal discourse does 
not start “as soon as someone says ‘no’ to given practices and challenges existing 
norms because he or she feels that they are no longer justificable.” A legal dis-
course has already begun earlier, with a non-discursive closure which, although 
more or less transformable, frames in advance the terms in which a collective can 
acknowledge and respond to normative challenges, and which ruins any attempt to 
reconstruct the normative content of a politics of boundaries in terms of an “ideal” 
speech situation, regardless of whether it is construed transcendentally or other-
wise.   
It is for this very reason that I have insisted, at the outset of this Reply to 
Critics, that the relation between a legal order and societal interaction is not the re-
lation between a particular and a general normativity, such that the parties to le-
gal conflict dip into the normative resources of the latter to “restore agreement” in 
the former. While societal normativity certainly provides normative material for 
justifications of the normative stances defended by parties in conflict, it attests to 
normative incompossibilities as much as it does to joint possibilities in the form of 
agreement. The point, then, is not, as Rummens argues, that the legal discourse 
draws on societal normativity to reach agreement on “local problems” because it 
makes no sense to think that the legal discourse could rationalize the social world 
as a whole. The point is, rather, that it is at the local level in which societal interac-
tion manifests itself as orderable and unorderable to a given legal order, as the loca-
tion and irreducible dis-location of normative claims and counterclaims. This by no 
means entails an endorsement of the “separation” of law and morality in the spirit 
of legal positivism; it means that we need to understand their relation otherwise 
than in the terms postulated by the discourse theory of law. As argued in chapter 
seven of FLG, albeit in a very tentative way that requires far more detailed elabo-
ration, the morality of law would not reside in legal obligations being a particular 
instantiation of relations of reciprocity between human beings as humans, but ra-
ther in the collective’s disposition to restrain from neutralizing or destroying the 
bearers of normative claims which resist inclusion into the circle of legal reciproci-
ty. 
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  These considerations lead over into the second of Rummens’ objections: dis-
course theory is not oriented to the elimination of the “strangeness” of the other: 
the whole thrust of Habermas’ thinking is oriented, as Rummens puts it, to “the 
inclusion of the other as a stranger,” an injunction which I would surely want to 
endorse. The fundamental question here is this: what concept of strangeness is 
available to the Habermasian injunction to include the other as a stranger? 
The core of an answer is to be found in a passage in the introduction to 
Habermas’ late work, The Inclusion of the Other: “solidarity with the other as one of 
us refers to the flexible ‘we’ of a community that resists all substantial determina-
tions and extends its permeable boundaries ever further.” (Habermas 2005, xxxv-
xxxvi) Notice the shift: the inclusion of the other “as a stranger” means the inclu-
sion of the other “as one of us.” For Habermas and for Rummens there need be no 
loss, no assimilation involved in this passage. This is exactly where I part ways 
with both Habermas and Rummens. The strange, in its strong dimension discussed 
in FLG, is what raises a normative claim that resists inclusion “as one of us,” that 
resists equalization as a particular under a general norm.  
The reductive reading of strangeness I reject is connected to an ambiguity of 
the German term Inklusion, which means both inclusion (Einschließung) and inte-
gration (Einbeziehung). Whereas Habermas opposes the first term to exclusion 
(Ausschließung), he introduces no oppositional term for the second. (Habermas 
1998, 139) The idea behind this conceptual distinction is to sketch out an alterna-
tive to forms of democracy that include by excluding, as reflected in the disjunc-
tion announced in the title of the article which develops the distinction: 
Inklusion—Einbeziehen oder Einschließen? For a discourse theory of law, the 
strange is strange to the extent that it can be “integrated” without loss or assimila-
tion into a collective “as one of us” because it is a form of strangeness that, by way 
of a dialectic of the particular and general, can come to be seen as a particular in-
stantiation of a norm which is deemed common to all members of a collective: e 
pluribus unum. Habermas has this derivative sense of strangeness in mind when 
stating that “[t]he ‘inclusion of the other’ means rather that the boundaries of the 
community are open for all, also and most especially for those who are strangers to 
one another and want to remain strangers’.” By contrast, for a phenomenology of 
a-legality the strong dimension of the strange is the normative remainder that re-
sists inclusion as one of us because there can be no “integration” (Einbeziehung) 
other than as an act that excludes in the very process of including. Einbeziehung is 
quite simply always an Einschließung, hence also an Ausschließung. If 
Einbeziehung means a bringing into relation (Bezug), the strange is what withdraws 
in the very process of being brought into a normative relation: an Entzug. 
(Waldenfels 1994, 201 ff.) No “struggling for words” here, as Rummens thinks, 
other than the attempt to find a vocabulary for illuminating what cannot be said 
in a theory of legal discourse. 
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In short, the concepts of the strange and of inclusion which a discourse theory 
of law is prepared to accept are those which facilitate a rational process the end 
state of which Habermas, in a late text, qualifies as “complete inclusion” 
(Habermas 2001, 148). The telos of the legal discourse by which “a flexible ‘we” . . . 
resists all substantial determinations and extends its permeable boundaries ever 
further,” is to progressively overcome strangeness, to progressively overcome con-
tingency, even if the realization of “the ideal of an intact intersubjectivity” 
(Habermas), i.e. of “full reconciliation and full reciprocity” (Rummens), must be 
postponed infinitely in time. This is the “dogmatic core” of the concept of autono-
my defended by a discourse theory of law. And it is in this sense that, all claims to 
the contrary (Habermas 1992, 144-145; Benhabib 2006, 20), a discourse theory of 
law is “open-ended”: open to totality as the end of reason. 
That one must commit to this understanding of reason if one is to be the advo-
cate of a discourse theory of law is to acknowledge, in Rummens’ words, that 
“there is a moment of choice—albeit a choice without alternatives—involved in 
our commitment to the possibility of normative justification and the idea of free-
dom.” Strictly speaking, there is of course an alternative: the choice for irrationali-
ty, for the self-destruction of reason, rather than its self-preservation. For dis-
course theory, whoever refuses to engage in justifying her/his a-legal challenge to a 
given legal order is irrational and walks away from freedom, hence needn’t be tak-
en seriously. The problem is, however, that freedom, in all its concreteness, is not 
about the resolve to engage in justificatory practices in the legal discourse, in the 
singular: there are legal discourses in the plural, each of which opens up a range of 
normative claims that can be justified therein, while closing down a range of other 
possible justifications. Whoever raises a normative challenge to a given legal order, 
yet refuses to justify it to participants therein, is not necessarily walking away 
from justification altogether: s/he may well be walking away from justification in 
that legal order and because of the kinds of justifications it makes available and 
those it shuts down. Legal orders do not bring forth “the” domain of freedom in 
the singular, not even if its realization must be postponed ad infinitum; they bring 
forth domains of freedom in the plural, which allow for limited transformation and 
for variable intertwinements with other domains of freedom, but not for their 
totalization in “complete inclusion.” This understanding of a politics of boundaries 
does more justice, I think, to the open-endedness of a politics of boundaries than 
the totalizing model of legal rationality championed by Habermas cum suis. 
I conclude with some brief comments concerning Rummens’ critical questions 
about the normative position outlined in FLG. A first question concerns the source 
of an obligation of forbearance towards what resists inclusion in a legal order. In 
other words, the question is what could justify an obligation to preserve the 
strange by way of self-restraint, especially if, as Schmitt argues, the strange is 
what can and should be destroyed. I can do no more here than offer some indica-
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tions of the direction in which I would want to address this important question. I 
take my cue from Habermas’ thesis, as cited by Rummens: “Each must be able to 
recognize him- or herself in all that wears a human face.” Habermas stands shoul-
der to shoulder here with Jeremy Waldron, who, in defense of cosmopolitanism, 
appeals to Terence’s famous dictum, “I am a man, I consider nothing that is hu-
man alien to me.” FLG argues, against Waldron, that because the experience of 
the alien or strange is an irreducible feature of social life, whoever endorses this 
dictum ends up endorsing its inverted form: what is strange or alien is inhuman (or 
subhuman). Against the claims that nothing human is strange, and that the 
strange is in-or subhuman, FLG defends the humanity of the strange. It seems to 
me that a comparable shift is required with respect to Habermas’ thesis: each can 
and cannot recognize him- or herself in all that wears a human face. It is in this 
way that I would like to draw on the Levinasian motive of the “face”—a face, in-
cidentally, which is not only the face of the human but also of other sentient, and 
perhaps even non-sentient, beings—to make sense of a non-relational obligation to 
preserve the strange as a constitutive feature of the morality of law. Instead of in-
terpreting justice as mutual or reciprocal recognition, as endorsed by Habermas’ 
thesis, the shift I propose suggests that justice should be understood as asymmet-
rical recognition, that is, a politics of boundaries which recognizes the stranger as 
one of us and as irreducibly strange. 
The second of Rummens’ critical questions follows up on the first, and con-
cerns the viability of a normative theory that would link together relational and 
non-relational obligations: don’t the latter necessarily collapse into the former? 
And if they do, isn’t the strange that which can be recognized—and included—as 
one of us because it brings to our attention a practical possibility we can recognize 
as one of our own possibilities? This is also Christodoulidis’ question, but raised 
from the opposite direction, as it were: whereas Christodoulidis would invite me to 
resolutely push a-legality into the incommensurability of the absolutely strange, 
which does not register at all in a given legal order, Rummens would have me pull 
a-legality back in from the cold, into the safe fold of what is commensurable for a 
given legal order, such that, once the dialectic has done its work, the strange be-
comes a particular instance of a (transformed) general rule. From opposing direc-
tions, both would collapse a-legality into (il)legality. I decline their invitations, for 
the reasons indicated in my responses to Christodoulidis and Rummens, but grate-
fully concede to both that the task for a phenomenology of a-legality is to clarify 
what it means that asymmetrical recognition is the normative core of just a poli-
tics of boundaries.  
  
Neil Walker’s response invites me to consider what further lines of research fol-
low from the ideas set out in FLG, as regards general legal theory as well as law in 
a global setting. In both cases, he notes, the challenge that must be met by a theo-
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ry that focuses so emphatically on a reconstruction of legal order from a first-
person plural perspective is to incorporate the “objective” side of social theory into 
its account of law. I welcome the opportunity to indicate, albeit very sketchily, 
how I plan to further pursue the line of inquiry outlined in FLG, and how this in-
quiry could address at least some of his concerns with regard to general legal theo-
ry and to law under globalization. In a nutshell, fleshing out more fully the ACA-
model of legal order is pivotal to dealing with both concerns. 
With respect to general legal theory, the main challenge is to more fully devel-
op the notion of authority at issue in the ACA-model of legal order. Chapter 3 of 
FLG outlines a functional concept of authority, defining it in terms of what au-
thorities do: monitoring and enforcing joint action. Yet a functional approach side-
lines the practical question to which collectives must respond when drawing 
boundaries: what ought our joint action to be about? Chapter 7 goes part of the 
way in articulating the normative conception of authority which is presupposed by 
its functional characterization in the ACA-model of legal order. But the question 
that remains unanswered in FLG is what, under these conditions, could be a posi-
tive characterization of authority. My hunch, as mentioned earlier, is that, given 
the responsive nature of a politics of boundaries, a response that sets boundaries is 
authoritative, normatively speaking, to the extent that it deploys an asymmetrical 
recognition of the normative claim raised by the strange(r). In fact, it seems to me 
that asymmetrical recognition is the core of the concept of justice. In short, the 
problem of authority offers the opportunity for carrying further the line of inquiry 
opened up by FLG in a way that highlights its continuities and discontinuities 
with contemporary political and legal theory, while also drawing on social theory 
to test its capacity to reconstruct the normative import of a wide range of societal 
“struggles for recognition.”    
This is, however, only part of the theory of legal authority I would want to 
develop more fully. The other part turns on the insight that recognition is also al-
ways cognition. Indeed, FLG indicates on several occasions that the strange ap-
pears as what is unintelligible, as what cannot be understood, in contrast to the 
domain of the familiar. Yet it leaves unexplored how this cognitive dimension fits 
in with the normative resistance of a-legality. The question, “How do you know 
whether someone’s behavior is a-legal?”, which has often been put to me in the af-
termath of FLG, is interesting not so much because there could be a point of Ar-
chimedes from which it would be possible to decide whether an act is simply 
(il)legal or a-legal—there isn’t—but rather because it points to the cognitive di-
mension that is always involved in the normative qualification of behavior, both of 
ourselves, as a group, and of those who call us into question. In this sense, “is” and 
“ought” are entwined in the exercise of legal authority, such that a response to the 
normative question—“Who ought we to be?”— is also a response to the factual 
question—“Who are we?” This is the way, I believe, that Walker’s invitation to 
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take account of the “objective” side of social theory can and should be embraced 
by a first-person plural approach to legal order. On the one hand, what ought to be 
rendered to each as their own cannot be settled on merely normative grounds; do-
ing justice demands appropriate knowledge of the factual context in which legal 
boundaries are to be posited. The exercise of legal authority involves an epistemic 
dimension that opens it up to social theorizing in a broad sense of the term. On the 
other hand, it would seem that the “objective” side of social theory involves a first-
person plural perspective to the extent that cognition is also always recognition. 
Normative and epistemic authority are connected to each other in the process of 
setting the legal boundaries of collective action, and it should be a main concern of 
the ACA-model of legal order to understand how this takes place. 
Certainly, these considerations do no more than suggest what might be the 
systematic locus of the “objective” side of social theory in a first-person plural ac-
count of the concept of authority apposite to legal order in general. The further 
question, however, is how social theory could enrich a first-person plural account 
of legal order in the context of globalization. In this respect Twining notes that, in 
addition to the “identity” and “individuation” questions, there is a third question 
which informs contemporary legal theory. This is the “taxonomy” question: what 
significant classifications allow of distinguishing between legal orders? (Twining 
2009, 64 ff) I take this question, in a broad and sociologically rich sense of the 
term, to be the second of Walker’s concerns about where FLG could take us. 
Here again, I believe that ACA offers a blueprint for further inquiry that could 
address this concern. FLG avers that the ACA-model of law is sufficiently capa-
cious to accommodate a wide range of putative legal orders, while also sufficiently 
flexible to permit differentiating them in meaningful ways. Arguably, FLG makes 
a strong case for the former; but, as Walker correctly notes, it falls short of map-
ping the specific features which positively characterize legal orders in a global con-
text. I see two axes along which to integrate social theory, in particular sociologies 
of globalization, into a positive account of law in a globalizing context. The first 
focuses on the structural components of ACA itself: action; collective action; au-
thority. The idea would be to show that the transformations leading from the 
state-centered paradigm of law to the emergence of transnational and global law 
can be understood as transformations of each of these structural components. 
So, for example, if legal orders structure action by determining its spatial, tem-
poral, subjective, and material boundaries, the question is how globalization pro-
cesses give rise to new kinds of boundaries. What would be required is to put into 
place a conceptual framework that could show how different kinds of ACA give rise 
to different ways of drawing boundaries, each with their own kind of “precision” 
and “fixity.” Indeed, depending on their normative point and institutional form, 
different kinds of ACA call forth altogether different sorts of scales of preciseness 
and impreciseness. To chart these differences, drawing on the findings of sociolo-
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gies of globalization, should be an important task for the ACA-model of law in a 
global context. 
If we turn to the second structural component of ACA, collective action, a simi-
lar picture emerges. There are at least two kinds of transformations germane to col-
lective action, and which should be accounted for by the ACA-model of law. The 
first concerns the point of collective action, which should operate as the focus of an 
inquiry into the functional differentiation of legal orders typical of the contempo-
rary legal context. Secondly, the notion of collective action serves as the point of 
departure for an inquiry into the emergence of what the contemporary literature 
calls regimes, networks, and rhizomes. 
Finally, parallel transformations are visible with respect to authority. As con-
cerns the monitoring of joint action, the ACA-model of legal order should be able 
to integrate a host of new normative instruments, such as model contracts as de-
ployed in certain sectors of lex mercatoria, the regulations drawn up by interna-
tional accounting organizations, and technical regulations and standards. Im-
portantly, I envisage broadening the concept of authoritative monitoring of collec-
tive action to accommodate the distinctive contribution of scholarship and legal 
practice to the development of global law (Walker 2014). The ACA-model also wel-
comes an inquiry into the dédoublement of the monitoring and enforcement func-
tions of authority, as in lex mercatoria, where arbitration tribunals will monitor 
joint action, while states will be entrusted with the enforcement of awards handed 
down by those tribunals. Finally, the enforcement component of authority also 
opens up space for discussing the emergence of “soft law,” in contrast to “hard 
law.”  
If these are some of the ways in which the ACA-model of law makes for a so-
ciologically informed taxonomy of legal orders in a global setting, there is also a se-
cond axis along which it can be developed more fully. This axis concerns what I 
would call the political, technological, and economic circumstances of ACA in a 
global setting. In particular, the crisis and partial reconfiguration of the pub-
lic/private distinction (politics), the compression of space and time (technology), 
and the marketization (economy) that characterize emergent global legal orders 
can and should be reconstructed in terms of the ACA-model of law. Admittedly, 
this approach involves a decisive methodological constraint, which determines how 
the “objective” side of social theory can be rendered fruitful for a theory of legal 
order as a first-person plural concept. To the extent that law in a global setting, 
like all law, does not exist in isolation from politics, the economy, and techno-
science, each of these domains of action needs to be integrated into an analysis that 
tries to pin down the distinctive features of ACA in a global setting. Nevertheless, 
the integration this requires would not take place in the spirit of a theory of “law 
and (global) society,” which privileges political, economic, or techno-scientific ap-
proaches to law. Instead, what would interest me is to explore how these domains 
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of action play a role in making sense of law as ACA, that is, as a specific way of or-
ganizing the first-person plural perspective of a We in authoritatively mediated 
joint action. It is for this reason that I refer to these domains as the circumstances 
of ACA in a global setting. 
From the point of view of the central problem of FLG, namely, the bounda-
ries, limits, and fault lines of legal orders, this sociologically informed approach to 
law in a global setting calls forth a final and fundamental problem. Somewhat pro-
vocatively,  FLG notes in passing that, from the perspective of the fundamental 
form of the inside/outside distinction, globalization is a distraction. While I think 
this assertion still holds, it nonetheless invites an inquiry at the intersection be-
tween the sociology of globalization and a phenomenology of legal worlds. This in-
quiry remains largely untrammeled ground for FLG, which goes no further, in the 
Conclusion, than introducing, in a rudimentary and preliminary fashion, the cen-
tral problem of the world, in a phenomenological sense, as the horizon of all theo-
rizing about law in a global setting. It seems to me that the task for a sociologically 
informed phenomenology of law that aspires to carry further the ideas developed 
in FLG would be to understand how and why globalization is an enworlding 
(Verweltlichung), and precisely because not all legal enworlding is a globalization. 
At issue in this further inquiry is, ultimately, what it could mean, both normative-
ly and conceptually, that legal orders in a global setting speak to globalization as 
the emergent intertwinement of home- and strange worlds.  
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